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Abstract
This paper presents a model of individual behavior in minimum effort
coordination games, focusing primarily on the effects of the number of play-
ers and the introduction of intergroup competition. It is shown that inde-
pendent of the number of players and the number of competing groups, the
most inefcient equilibrium is always the stochastically stable one. Yet,
it turns out that the `security' of more efcient equilibria increases with a
decrease of the number of players and with an increase of the number of
competing groups.
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11 Introduction
This paper develops a model of individual behavior in repeated minimum effort
coordination games. The model focuses on two variants of the game, the `basic'
game followingVan Huyck et al. (1990), and a variant involvingintergroup com-
petition for a bonus described by Bornstein et al. (2002). The model is motivated
by the apparent lack of a theoretical benchmark case, the experimental observa-
tions in this game can be contrasted to. Thus, the primary objective of this paper
is to suggest a theoretical foundation of individual behavior in repeated minimum
effort coordination situations that abstracts from nonmainstream inuences like
`abnormal' behavior or strategic uncertainty.
The problem of coordination failure, i.e. inefcient coordination of in-
dividual behavior, is prevalent in many elds of economics, ranging from
PostWalrasian macroeconomics (see, for example, Cooper and John 1988;
Bryant 1996) to questions of providing work incentives in industrial organization
(Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997). The problem is stripped down to its very core
in the minimum effort coordination game initially proposed by Bryant (1983) and
introduced to experimental literature by Van Huyck et al. (1987, 1990). The out-
standingfeature of thisgame isthe fact that it givesrise to multipleNash equilibria
which are Pareto ranked. At the same time, the game is an exemplary for the type
of games showing a tension between efciency and security (Foster and Young,
1990; Young, 1993; Kandori et al., 1993). The `safest' equilibrium is the most
inefcient one, while the efcient equilibrium is the most `insecure' outcome
(Straub, 1995; Crawford, 1991; Goeree and Holt, 1998; Riechmann, 2002).
Moreover, and different from the closely related class of discrete public good
games (see, for example, Palfrey and Rosenthal 1984), the play of an inefcient
but secure equilibrium cannot be rationally caused by the intention to freeride
on the actions of others.
In the basic setting of the game (Van Huyck et al., 1990), players approach
the play of the inefcient equilibrium over time, thus displaying the problem of
coordination failure. Still, there is a number of notably different settings where
people play the efcient equilibrium instead.1 Apparently, these settings represent
ways ofsolvingtheproblemof coordinationfailure. The presentpaper is primarily
interested in cases of efcient coordination in settings relying on a very small
number of players or on the introduction of intergroup competition.
We known from the experiments by Van Huyck et al. (1990, 2001) that small
groups coordinate more efciently than large ones. We do not know, however,
why this is the case. There is no theoretical model explaining the working of
1See e.g. Berninghaus and Erhart (1998, 2001); Blume and Ortmann (2000);
Cachon and Camerer (1996); Cooper et al. (1992, 1994); Van Huyck et al. (1993).
2the coordination device `small groups'. Experiments by Bornstein et al. (2002)
and Riechmann and Weimann (2004) show that players coordinate efciently, if
they belong to several groups that compete against each other. Again, there is no
theoretical model on intergroup competition in these games.
This paper will be devoted to setting up a dynamic model of minimum effort
coordination incorporating the inuence of group size and intergroup competi-
tion. The rst part of the paper will derive the location of the stochastically stable
equilibrium, thus employing a rather classical concept of equilibrium selection.
Roughly speaking, the stochastically stable equilibrium is the `most secure' equi-
librium in the long run. In the presence of rare mistakes of others, players can
be expected to approach the play of this equilibrium over time. It will be shown
that independent of the group size and in both settings, i.e. in the basic and in the
intergroup competition setting, the most inefcient equilibrium is the stochasti-
cally stable one. In a way, this could be the end of the analysis. The model would
suggest that, independent of the setting and the number of players involved, theory
always predicts the play of the most inefcient equilibrium.
The paper takes a further step. It aims at quantifying the security or reliabil-
ity of all equilibria of the game. Security will be measured in terms of expected
sojourn time of states of the dynamics underlying the repeated game. This mea-
sure of reliability, subsequently called `stickiness' throughout this paper, will be
derived and analyzed with respect to its sensitivity towards changes in group size
and the number of competing groups. It will be shown that, even though the most
inefcient equilibrium remains the most secure one, the security of efcient equi-
libria increases with a decrease in group size and with an increase in the number
of competing groups. This nding might give rise to the development of more
rened models of individual behavior in this type of games.
The paper proceeds as follows. After the formal introduction of the basic and
the repeated game, the stochastically stable equilibrium of the onegroup game
is derived and shown to be the most inefcient one, a task that at the same time
serves as a preparationof a more broader characterization of the reliabilityof every
single equilibrium of the game. After that, the intergroup competition variant of
the game is introduced and analyzed, again including the derivationof the stochas-
tically stable equilibrium, which is shown to still be equal to the most inefcient
equilibrium. After that, the ideaof `stickiness'of equilibriaisintroducedas a mea-
sure of their security. It is shown that stickiness of efcient equilibria increases
with an increasing number of competing groups and with decreasing group size.
Finally, some numerical computations for a number of wellknown experiments
are conducted, indicating that indeed, stickiness of the most efcient equilibrium
is a good though not sufcient predictor of individual behavior in the minimum
effort coordination game.
32 The Basic Game
The basic game in focus is the minimum effort coordination game inspired
by Bryant (1983) and introduced to experimental economic literature by
Van Huyck et al. (1990). It involves a group consisting of n players indexed
i, each choosing his action ei (because of a common framing of this game as a
game of `team production' (Bryant, 1996) often called `effort level') from the set
of individual actions: ei 2 E =

e1 = 1; e2 = 2; e3 = 3; :::; em = m
	
, E is a dis-
crete set of m elements.2 Hence, action proles are given by (e1; e2; :::; en) 2 En.
Payoffs to agent i, pi, are essentially determined by the minimum effort level




, and the agent's own effort level, ei:
pi = aen bei (1)
with a > b > 0.








and thus, all uniform action proles, i.e. proles with all agents choosing the same
effort level, constitute the Nash equilibria. The Nash equilibria are Paretoranked:
The equilibrium with all agents choosing the maximum effort level is the Pareto
efcient one, lower common effort levels mean lower levels of efciency.
3 The Repeated OneGroup Game
In the following, the dynamics of the repeated game are introduced and analyzed.
As the rst aim of the paper is the derivation of the stochastically stable equilib-
rium of the game, the paper follows the `cookbook recipe' for nding stochas-
tically stable equilibria by Fudenberg and Levine (1998). It leaves the track of
this recipe, when it comes to using the FreidlinWenzel method, and proceeds by
application of a basic Markov chain framework instead.
3.1 Unperturbed Best Response Dynamics
The dynamic model is based on a simple assumption of individual play, namely
myopic best response play.3 People do not know the current (period t) choices
2It is straightforward to extend the analysis to the case of action spaces containing actions
with a common distance of d, i.e. E =

e1; e2; e3; :::; em	
with ei  ei 1 = d8i. As this yields
no further results, but adds signicant notational inconvenience, we will restrict ourselves to the
`simpler case' of unit distances.
3Besides the fact that this is a standard form of dynamics in theoretical analyses, it can be
found from various experimental results that this indeed the rationale that is used by the majority
4of the other players, but they know the group minimum from the previous period
(t  1). In period t, every agent is assumed to play the best response to the action
prole from the previous period:4
8i : ei(t) = en(t 1) (3)
The resulting dynamics of the repeated game can be described as a degenerate
Markov process5 modeling the transitions from one Nash equilibrium to another.6
Thus, every Nash equilibrium represents a state of the Markov process. Accord-
ingly, there are m different states, each identied by the common individualaction
played in it: 1; 2; :::; m. With all agents playing best responses, all Nash equilib-
ria are absorbing states of the Markov process. The transition matrix is equal to
the mm identity matrix.
3.2 Perturbed Best Response Dynamics
As a second step of analysis, the focus is put on (slightly) perturbed dynamics.
Assume that every player almost surely plays a best response but very rarely, i.e.
with a very small probability e, does not do so, but chooses his action by chance. e
is assumed to be the same for every player and constant over time. Moreover, e is
common knowledge. The act of randomly choosing a new action will be called a
`mutation', thus adopting the term from evolutionary theory. Now, due to the fact
that single choices of individual effort levels ei might occur at random, the group
minimum effort level en becomes a random variable.
of participants in the baseline settings of the game.
4In fact, agent i should play a best response to previous period's action prole of everybody




. This, probably more correct specication yields one
differencein behaviorto thespecicationin(3): Ifagentiwas theonlyagentplayingtheminimum
effort level in t  1, he should in fact increase his effort level in t, only to nd that in the same
period, everybody else decreased his effort to what i played in t  1. Thus, in the course of at
most two time steps, the specication of this footnote and the one given in (3) lead to the same
dynamics. Moreover, as (a) this paper concentrates on transitions between equilibria and (b) the
situationleadingto thedifferencebetweenthe two typesofdynamicsinfocuscan onlyoccuronce,
namely in the very rst period of the game, the specication in (3) should be sufciently precise.
5The Markov process in the unperturbed model is degenerate, because the process itself is
deterministic. Still, a formulation of the model in terms of a Markov process is in order, since it
serves as a preparation of the upcoming analysis of truly stochastic dynamics.
6Because agents are assumed to play best responses, there is no need to explicitely focus on
transitions to and from states which are not Nash equilibria, which remarkablyfacilitates the anal-
ysis.
53.2.1 Simultaneous Mutations
The probability of an agent's mutation, e, will be called his `individual mutation
probability'. Let the individual mutation probabilities be the same for every agent
and let agents' mutations take place independent of each other. Then, the proba-
bility of µ mutations happening in the same period, Pµ, is given by the following
proposition.
PROPOSITION 1 If the individual mutation probability is e, the probability of µ
out of n agents mutating at the same time is given by






PROOF: Every individual mutation is a Bernoulli trial with e giving the
probability of a `success'. The probability of µ mutations in n independent such
trials is Binomially distributed with parameters µ, n, and e. 
3.2.2 Probability of Minima
If an agent mutates, he chooses his new strategy randomly. Assume that every
action in the action space E is chosen with positive probability P(ek) > 08ek 2
E. In statistical terms, because of the act of mutation, player i's action choice
ei becomes a random variable. Let Eµ denote the minimum of µ i.i.d. random
variables ei 2 E. Then, the probability that the minimum of µ i.i.d. action choices
(by mutation) equals ek is given by
PROPOSITION 2
P(Eµ = ek) =
h







The important aspect of Proposition 2 is the fact that the probabilities of min-
ima exist, are well dened, and can easily be computed. The proof is delayed to
Appendix A.
In order to provide a sensible behavioral model, it will be assumed that the
play of low group minima has a weakly higher probability than that of higher
ones. ASSUMPTION
P(Eµ = ek)  P(Eµ = ek  1): (6)
63.2.3 Transition Probabilities
Transitions from one period to the next in the perturbed repeated game can be seen
as processes involving two steps: First, (possibly,) mutations take place. Then,
secondly, every agent, no matter if having mutated or not, plays the best response
to the resulting  possibly perturbed  tentative action prole. This order of
steps makes sure that at the beginning of every new period, a Nash equilibrium is
played. The only question of course is, which one of the m possible equilibria this
will be. The answer to this question is seemingly simple: Is is the equilibrium that
is characterized by the minimum effort level of both mutants and nonmutants.
Perturbed best response dynamics can, again, be viewed as a Markov process
with m states corresponding to the m equilibria of the underlying game. The ran-
dom event that characterizes a (non trivial) transition in the process is a change in
group minimum play, i.e. a change of en. Transition probabilities from state u to
state v in the perturbed minimum effort coordination game depend on two factors
only: (a) the direction of the transition, which can be upwards (u< v), downwards
(u > v), or trivial (u = v), and (b) the destination of the transition, v. Probabilities
of upwards transitions to state v are denoted as p(v), downwards transition prob-
abilities to v read p(v), probabilities of trivial transitions from u to v are denoted
 p(v). Probabilities of transitions into the same direction are independent of their
particular starting state u. A downwards transition to state v = 3, for example, that
started in u = 4 has the same probability as one that started in, say, u = 6. The
only important aspect is the fact that the transition must really be downwards, i.e.
the starting state u must higher than v.
Let pu;v denote the probabilityof a direct transition from state u to state v in the
Markov process: pu;v = P(en(t) = vjen(t  1) = u). Then, transition probabilities
are given in the proposition.
PROPOSITION 3 The probabilities of a direct transition from state u to state v





p(v) = PnP(En = v) for u < v
p(v) = å
n
µ=1PµP(Eµ = v) for u > v
 p(v) = P0+ p(v)+å
n 1
µ=1Pµ(1 P(Eµ  v)) for u = v
(7)
PROOF: For an upwards transition, u < v, all n agents must mutate and the
minimum outcome of their mutations must equal v. The respective probability is
p(v) = PnP(En = v):
In order to transit from the present minimum effort level of u downwards to
a lower minimum effort level of v, there must be one mutation resulting in v, or
7two mutations, the minimum of which is v, or three mutations with a minimum
result of v, or ..., or n mutations with a minimum outcome of v. The aggregate






Finally, there are several random events that let the process remain in the
present state. First, the process remains in state u (u = v) if there is no muta-
tion. Secondly, the process remains in u, if there are between one and n mutations
with a minimum outcome of u. As this is the same event as the one leading to a
downwards transition to state u, the probability for this event is p(u). Last, the
process will not leave u if there are between one and n 1 mutations, the minima
of which are greater than u. (In these cases, the remaining nonmutants' effort
level of u represents the minimum effort level.) The joint probability of all of
these events is













 p(1) p(2) p(3)  p(m)
p(1)  p(2) p(3)  p(m)
. . .








As long as the individual mutation probability e is strictly positive, e > 0, every
entry of matrix (8) is strictly positive. This means that the underlying Markov
process is regular, i.e. irreducible and aperiodic (Goodman, 1988, pp. 164). From
this, it follows that the unique long term distribution of states (the limit distribu-
tion) can be computed, which is described by the stochastic row vector a with




ak = 1; (9)
with ak giving the long term frequency of play of state k.
7Following common use of transition matrices (see e.g. Feller 1968), the starting states of
transition are denoted in the rows and the destinations in the columns.
8As the structure of P is comparably simple, so are the elements of a. In search
of the limit distribution of states for vanishing individual mutation probability, i.e.
lime!0a, rst, a1, the long term frequency of play of the lowest possible effort
level, e1 = 1, must be computed. Solving the system of linear equations given in
(9) results in (among others) a1:
a1 = a1  p(1)+(1 a1)p(1) =
p(1)
1   p(1)+ p(1)
(10)
From this, it can concluded that a (unique) stochastically stable equilibrium
exists and is equal to the one characterized by common play of an effort level of
1.
PROPOSITION 4 Under the regime of perturbed best response dynamics, the
stochastically stable equilibrium of the onegroup game is the one characterized
by common play of the lowest effort level:
lim
e!0
a1 = 1: (11)
4 InterGroup Competition
In theintergroupcompetitionsetting,the minimumcoordinationgameissimulta-
neously played by g different groups, each consisting of n members. These groups
are competingwitheach other. Every memberiof groupg getsa higherpayoff, i.e.
a bonusofc>0, if hisgroup'sminimum,eng, isthe (weakly) highestof allgroups'
minima. If the highest minimum effort level is played by several groups, mem-




denoting the maximum group minimum effort level of all g competing groups,
individual payoffs result as
pi;g =
(
aeng bei if eng < eg
aeng bei+c if eng = eg : (12)
All action proles with a uniform action played within groups but not neces-
sarily across groups are Nash equilibria. (The simplest way of seeing that this is
true is to verify that no single player can increase his payoff by unilaterally devi-
ating from his group's common effort level, independent of whatever the common
8This is the setting from Riechmann and Weimann (2004). In the experiments by
Bornstein et al.(2002), involvingtwogroupsincompetition,incaseofatie, both(winning)groups
share the bonus, i.e. get an extra pay of c=2.
9effort level of other, competing groups may be.) Thus, in a game with g groups
and m different effort levels, there are mg different Nash equilibria.
Individual myopic best responses are straightforward: No matter if your group
is the best or a worse one, play your group's minimum effort level. (This rationale
results from the specic static expectations imposed by the denition of myopic
best response dynamics.) Consequence is the same kind of dynamics as the one
in the basic onegroup game: As the location of the Nash equilibria is untouched,
the resulting myopic best response dynamics are nothing else than g many inde-
pendent processes described for the onegroup setting. This means, among oth-
ers, that under the regime of perturbed best response dynamics, the location of
the stochastically stable equilibrium does not change from the onegroup to the
intergroup competition setting.
4.1 Competitive Response Dynamics
Experimental evidence (Bornstein et al., 2002; Riechmann and Weimann, 2004)
strongly suggests that individual behavior in intergroup competition situations
signicantly differs from behavior in the onegroup setting. Involved in group
competition, people do not stick to the simple myopic best response behavior as
dened by (3). Instead, group competition seems to induce the wish to make
one's own group the better one. This notion is strongly supported by results
from the eld of social psychology, where it is found that  given certain con-
ditions  intergroup competition enhances individual motivation and effort.
(See Bornstein and Erev 1994, and, for a survey, Tajfel 1982.)
One important result of the experiments by Bornstein et al. (2002) as well as
by Riechmann and Weimann (2004) is the observation that, in addition to the min-
imum effort level of the own group, the minimum effort levels of the other, com-
peting groups strongly guide individuals' behavior. It turns out that the minimum
effort level of the best group is the most prominent attractor of individual behav-
ior. Experimental evidence suggests that individual behavior is not independent of
what players in other groups do. Consequently, simple myopic best response dy-
namics can be found to be entirely inappropriate as a model of individual behavior
in the intergroup competition setting.
Based on the experimental ndings mentioned above, in this section, a type
of dynamics will be dened that take account of both, the own group's minimum
and the best groups' minimum choices. For this means, it is assumed that every
agent follows the same (lexicographic) behavioral rules, for convenience called
`competitive response' behavior:
 rst priority: Try to make your group the best group. (This concerns inter
group relations.)
10 second priority: Try not to waste any effort. (This concerns intra group
relations.)
These two rules translate into a simple rationale requiring every member i of
every group g to try to play the maximum of all groups' minima,
e?
i;g = eg: (13)
All groups exerting the highest group minimum effort level receive the higher
payoff. Consequently, all equilibria produced by competitive response dynamics
are states with every agent in every group playing the same action. Thus, again,
the number of different equilibria in the dynamic ggroup competition game is the
same as the number of possible individual actions, m.
Proceeding in accordance to the method used for the onegroup game, the
unperturbed competitive dynamics are viewed rst. The basic assumption is that
in every period t, every individual plays the competitive response to the previous
period's strategy prole, which is best represented by the set of group minimum
effort levels. Thus, unperturbed competitive dynamics are completely described
by a lagged version of (13).
8i; g : ei;g(t) = eg(t 1): (14)
Like in the onegroup game, these dynamics can be seen as a degenerate
Markovprocess describing the transition between the equilibria of the game.
Again, all equilibria represent absorbing states of the process, such that, under the
regime of competitive responses (13), the transition matrix is equal to the mm
identity matrix.
4.2 Perturbed Competitive Dynamics
Let perturbed competitive dynamics be a form of competitive dynamics which
is occasionally disturbed by (rare) individual mutations. Mutations are (again)
i.i.d., such that the probability of simultaneous mutations is again described by
Proposition 1.
4.2.1 Probability of Maxima
The maximumof the minimumeffort levelsof g competinggroups, eg, is a random
variable. This results from the notion that every group minimum effort level en
is a random variable with probabilities (densities) given in Proposition 2. Group
minima are i.i.d. across groups. As eg is simply the maximum of g many random
variables which are i.i.d. in E, the probabilities for eg can be computed.
11PROPOSITION 5 The probability that eg, the maximum of g many i.i.d. group min-















For theprocessof perturbedcompetitiveresponsedynamicsinthe ggroupcompe-
tition game, a transition matrix must be derived. Now, transitions are direct moves
from one maximum of group minima to another one. Consequently, transition
probabilities for the ggroup competition setting can be computed as probabilities
of maxima: Let pu;v(g) denote the probability of a direct transition from state u to
state v in the ggroup setting, pu;v(g) = P
 
eg(t) = vjeg(t  1) = u

. A transition
from state u to state v takes place if there is at least one group transiting to v and if
v is the highest state played by any of the g groups. In other words, the destination
state v must be the maximum of all single groups' transition destinations. Con-
sequently, the transition probability can be computed from Prop. 5 and the single
















Again, there is a difference between downwards transitions, trivial transitions, and
upwards transitions, such that the respective proposition reads:
PROPOSITION 6 In the perturbed intergroup competition game with g groups,
the probability of a direct transition from state u to state v is given by
pu;v(g) =
8
> > > > > > > <










































for i = j
(17)
PROOF
By puttingthe respectiveonegrouptransitionprobabilitiesfromProposition 3
into (16). 
9It is easily veried that, of course, pu;v(1) = pu;v as given in (7), clarifying that the onegroup
game from the previous section is merely a special case of the general ggroup competition game.







 pg(1) pg(2) pg(3)  pg(m)
pg(1)  pg(2) pg(3)  pg(m)
. . .








From the transition matrix (18), the unique long run distribution of states can be
computed. For the long run frequency of 1play, this gives
a1 =
pg(1)
1   pg(1)+ pg(1)
(19)
Letting the individual mutation probability e approach zero, it can be found
that the only effort level used in the long run is the lowest one. This leads to the
proposition:
PROPOSITION 7 In the minimum effort coordination game with g competing




a1 = 1: (20)
This result shows that not only in the one group minimum effort coordination
game, but in fact for any number of competing groups, the equilibrium character-
ized by the lowest possible effort level is the stochastically stable equilibrium.
5 Stickiness as a Measure of Security of Equilibria
While thenotionofstochasticstabilityisa notionof longrunbehaviorinthe game,
it iscertainly notenoughto characterize (objective)uncertaintyof thegame. There
is still a need for a measure of `objective riskiness' or `objective security' of the
different equilibria of the game. The basic question that cannot be answered by
stochastic stabilityalone is: `How riskyis it to (try to) play the 7equilibrium,how
risky is the 6equilibrium etc.?' For means of measuring this type of `security' of
equilibria, a clear measure is needed. Consequently, in this section, a notion of
`stickiness' of equilibria is introduced. (This phrase is not intended to parallel any
notions of economic rigidities sometimes labeled by this term.) An equilibrium
is the stickier, the higher the probability is that it, once reached, will be played
13again in the next period. This notion is of course closely related to the idea of the
expected sojourn time of the respective state of the underlying Markov process
(Goodman, 1988, p. 177). Expected sojourn time gives the expected number of
periods the dynamic process will remain in a given state of the Markov chain, i.e.
in the respective equilibrium of the game. In the case of this paper (i.e. for regular
Markov chains), the expected sojourn time for equilibrium v in a game with g





In order to keep things simple, the paper will not make direct use of sg(v), but
will rely on  pg(v) as a measure of stickiness of equilibrium v.
It can be found that there are two major factors inuencing  pg(v), which are
the number of agents per group, n, and the number of competing groups, g. For
both factors, the direction of inuence is roughly characterized as follows.
 More efcient (`higher') equilibria become stickier with decreasing number
of agents per group and increasing number of competing groups.
 Less efcient (`low') equilibria become less sticky with decreasing number
of agents per group and increasing number of competing groups.
Consequently, there are two alternative ways of increasing stickiness, thus
decreasing strategic uncertainty and by that increasing group performance, the
increase of the number of competing groups and the decrease of the size of groups.
Many small groups will perform much more efcient than few large ones.
5.1 Equilibrium Level
First, the relation between stickiness and the equilibrium effort level v is analyzed.
This relation is characterized by the expression
Dv  pg(v) =  pg(v)   pg(v 1) (22)
PROPOSITION 8 For low numbers of competing groups, lowlevel equilibria
(small v) are stickier than highlevel equilibria (large v). For sufciently high
numbers of competing groups, this relation turns to the opposite.
Dv  pg(v)

< 0 for small g
> 0 for sufciently high g (23)
145.2 Number of Groups
In order to nd the direction of inuence of the number of competing groups, g, on
the stickiness of equilibria,  pg(v), the sign of following expression is of primary
interest:
Dg  pg(v) =  pg(v)   pg 1(v) (24)
PROPOSITION 9 The stickiness of low equilibria (small v) decreases in the num-
ber of competing groups. The stickiness of high equilibria (large v) increases in
the number of competing groups.
Dg  pg(v)

< 0 for low v
> 0 for high v (25)
5.3 Number of Group Members
Up to this point in the paper, the number of members per group has not been
explicitely taken account of. Now, while deriving the inuence of group size on
the stickiness of equilibria, the notation needs to be enhanced. Thus, for example,
let  pg(v;n) denote the probability of staying in equilibrium v with g competing
groups, each consisting of n members. Other notations parallel this one.
The inuence of the number of group members on stickiness of equilibria will
be analyzed by means of the following measure:
Dn  pg(v) =  pg(v;n)   pg(v;n 1) (26)
PROPOSITION 10 The stickiness of low equilibria (small v) increases in n. The
stickiness of high equilibria (high v) decreases in n.
Dn  pg(v)

> 0 for low v
< 0 for high v (27)
5.4 Numerical Results
For wellknown experimental settings following the setup described in this pa-
per, numerical computations of the stickiness of the equilibria have been car-
ried out. These computations are based on the assumption that individual mu-
tation probability is e = 0:1 and that individual mutations are uniformly dis-
tributed in [1; :::; 7]. Table 5.4 gives the results of the computations (in the
lines `stickiness of') in form of  pg(v) and in form of expected sojourn time (in
brackets). Moreover, the table lists some benchmark results of the respective ex-
periments. It is easy to recognize from the table that indeed those experiments
15source vHBB90a vHBB90 vHBB90 RW04b BGN02c vHBB90 RW04
treatment A A A base1 NC C comp2a
Parameters
g 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
n 16 15 14 7 7 2 7
no. of indep.
observations 4 2 1 6 6 14 4
minimumd 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.17 2.17 6.07 6.38
meane 1.59 1.27 1.79 2.60 2.62 6.21 6.64
stickiness off
1 1.00 (¥) 1.00 (¥) 1.00 (¥) 1.00 (¥) 0.99 (100) 1.00 (¥)
2 0.79 (4.8) 0.81 (5.3) 0.82 (5.6) 0.90 (10) 0.97 (33.3) 0.99 (100)
3 0.63 (2.7) 0.65 (2.9) 0.67 (3.0) 0.81 (5.3) 0.94 (16.7) 0.96 (25)
4 0.49 (2.0) 0.52 (2.1) 0.54 (2.2) 0.74 (3.9) 0.91 (11.1) 0.93 (14.3)
5 0.39 (1.7) 0.41 (1.7) 0.44 (1.8) 0.66 (2.9) 0.89 (9.1) 0.89 (9.1)
6 0.31 (1.4) 0.32 (1.5) 0.35 (1.5) 0.60 (2.5) 0.86 (7.1) 0.84 (6.2)
7 0.24 (1.3) 0.26 (1.4) 0.29 (1.4) 0.53 (2.1) 0.84 (6.2) 0.78 (4.5)
aVan Huyck et al. (1990)
bRiechmann and Weimann (2004)
cBornstein et al. (2002)
daverage group minimum effort level in secondtolast period
eaverage group mean effort level in secondtolast period
f  pg(v), expected sojourn time in brackets
Table 1: Numerical Computations.  pg(v) and sg(v) as functions of n and g. e =
0:1, m = 7, individual mutations uniformly distributed
lead to a relatively high stickiness of the efcient (`7') equilibrium are the ones
with experimental outcomes close to 7. The latter experiments are the one by
Van Huyck et al. (1990) with a very low number of members per group and the
one by Riechmann and Weimann (2004) with two competing groups.
This nding might lead to simple behavioral hypotheses like for example the
idea that players might do something like `security satiscing': Instead of just
maximizing payoffs or minimizing risk, they might tend to play the equilibrium
that is `sufciently save'. If for example the aspiration level in terms of stickiness
that players wish to achieve is about six periods expected sojourn time, they will
chose the `1'equilibrium in all basic settings, but the `6' or even the `7' equi-
librium in the setting with one group of two players and in the setting with two
competing groups of seven players each. Still, the formulation of behavioral hy-
potheses is not the main aim of this paper, and, moreover, that aim requires much
more experimental work than has currently been undertaken.
166 Summary
This paper presents a model of dynamic behavior in two different variants of the
minimum effort coordination game. The derivation of stochastically stable equi-
libria shows that in the basic game as well as in an intergroup competition variant
of the game, the most inefcient equilibriumis the stochastically stable one. In or-
der to gain more insight into the structure of uncertainty underlying the equilibria
of the game, a notion of `stickiness' of the equilibria is derived. The paper shows
that generally, more efcient equilibria are less sticky than less efcient ones. Yet,
stickiness of more efcient equilibria can be notably enhanced by either decreas-
ing the group size or increasing the number of competing groups.
Some numerical computations indicate that objective probabilitymight be suf-
cient to develop some simple behavioral hypotheses of individualbehavior. This,
nevertheless, is not the aim of the present paper. The development of a behavioral
theory on individual behavior in the minimum effort coordination game should be
the next step of research, a step that requires both, theoretical work and more and
rened experimental observation.
17A The Repeated OneGroup Game
PROPOSITION 2
P(Eµ = ek) =
h







First note that for the discrete distribution on E = f1; 2; :::; mg, whose elements have a dis-
tance of 1 between each adjacent pair of actions, it is true that
P(ei < ek +1) = P(ei  ek): (28)
Now, interpret the (random) events described by the following probabilities:
 P(ei  ek): In a random trial, the outcome ei is less or equal ek.








n: In n i.i.d. random trials, there is at least one outcome ei with ei ek.
Denote this last probability by P(En  ek):






P(En < ek) = 1 
h
1 P(ei  ek  1)
in
(30)
gives the probability of the event that in n trials, there is at least one outcome ei strictly less then
ek.
Now, consider the difference between the probabilities from (29) and (30): The expression
P(En = ek) = P(En  ek) P(En < ek) (31)
gives the probability of the event that in n trials, there is at least one outcome ei  ek, but no
outcome ei < ek. This is of course the same event as having at least one ei = ek, but no outcome
ei <ek. This, nally, is the same as the event that ei =ek is the minimumoutcome of the n random
trials.
It remains to be shown that the difference stated in (31) is indeed equal to the one given in the
proposition, which is straightforward from a look at (28)



















18B Stochastic Stability in the OneGroup Game
LEMMA 1 For individual mutation probability e approaching zero, the probability of a total of





1 for µ = 0
0 for µ > 0 (32)
PROOF Compute the respective limits of (4).
LEMMA 2 For individual mutation probability e approachingzero, the limit of the rst derivative









 n for µ = 0
n for µ = 1
0 for µ > 1
: (33)
PROOF























for µ > 1
The limits of these rst derivatives for vanishing e are the ones given in Lemma 2. 
LEMMA 3
(a) The probability of reaching the lowest state, state 1, from a higher state u > 1, p(1), ap-
proaches zero for individual mutation probability e approaching zero,
lim
e!0
p(1) = 0; (34)
(b) and the rst derivative of this probability with respect to zero goes to nP(E1 = 1) for vanish-





= nP(E1 = 1): (35)
19PROOF
(a) p(1) = å
n
µ=1PµP(Eµ = 1) ) lime!0 p(1) = 0




























P(Eµ = 1) = nP(E1 = 1)

LEMMA 4




 p(1) = 1; (36)








(a) First, recognize that  p(1) can be simplied:




Pµ [1 P(Eµ  1)] :
Then, because of P(Eµ < 1) = 0,



























= P0+PnP(En = 1)+(1 P0 Pn)
= P0+Pn[P(En = 1) 1] P0+1
= 1 Pn[1 P(En = 1)]
(38)
20The last line of the above allows for a simple interpretation: The probability of staying in
the state of 1 equals one minus the probability of having all n agents mutate but not reach a
minimum of 1.
Letting e ! 0, Pn becomes zero, which proves (36).






















It is known that
a1 =
p(1)
1   p(1)+ p(1)
: (10)
In search of lime!0 a1, it is found that, because of the rst parts of Lemmata 3 and 4, the











1   p(1)+ p(1)











































= P(en1  ek)P(en2  ek) ::: P(eng  ek): (39)





= P(en  ek)g (40)
Now note that in order to make ek the maximum outcome, the maximum choice must be
less or equal ek but at the same time not less than ek, i.e. not less or equal ek  1. Consequently,
Proposition 5 holds. 
In order to show that ek = 1 characterizes the stochastically stable state for every number g
of competing groups, analyze the expression given in (19), thereby making use of the following
lemmata.





g(1) = 0 (41)
Proof
First notice that the g group transition probability p
g(1) can be denoted in terms of the one






























According to the rst part of Lemma 3, p(1) vanishes for vanishing e and consequently, this is
what p
g(1) does. 
In addition to Lemma 4, which describes the behavior of  p(1) and its rst derivative for
vanishing e, we nd that every higher derivative of  p(1) with respect to e vanishes for vanishing e:
LEMMA 6 For vanishing individual mutation probability e, all higher derivatives of  p(1) with




dex = 0 8 x > 0 (42)
Proof:





dex [1 P(En = 1)]
22From Lemma 2, we can nd that lime!0
dxPn
dex = 0 for n > 1, such that Lemma 6 holds true. 
From this, we can conclude that for e ! 0,  pg(1) approachesunity and all derivatives of  pg(1)
with respect to e vanish.
LEMMA 7 For vanishing individual mutation probability,
(a)  pg(1) approaches unity,
lim
e!0
 pg(1) = 1: (43)
and




dex = 0 8x > 0: (44)
Proof
First recognize that the ggroup transition probability  pg(1) can be written in terms of the





























=  p(1)g (45)
Thus, lime!0  pg(1)=(lime!0  p(1))
g, which, accordingto Lemma 4, gives lime!0  pg(1)=1. This
proves the rst part of the Lemma.
From (45), the rst derivative is easily computed.
d  pg(1)
de
= g  p(1)g 1d  p(1)
de
:
From Lemma 6, we know that lime!0
d  p(1)



















It is obvious that every higher derivative of  pg(1) contains a derivative of  p(1) in every additive
term. As we know from Lemma 6 that in the limit for e ! 0, every derivative of  p(1) vanishes,
we can conclude that Lemma 7 holds. 
From the above, we can state a condition for state 1 being stochastically stable.
23LEMMA 8 A stochastically stable state exists and is equal to the state characterized by common
play of ek = 1, if there is a natural number x 2 N, such that the xth derivative of  pg(1) with respect
to e is different from zero:
lim
e!0
a1 = 1 if 9x 2 N such that
dx pg(1)
dex 6= 0 (46)
Proof
From Lemma 5 and the rst part of Lemma 7, we know that the denominator of (19) ap-
proaches zero in the limit for e ! 0. Consequently, the limit of a1 must be computed by means of














As we know that dx1
dex = 0 and
dx  pg(1)










This means that lime!0a1 = 1, if there exists an x such that the xth derivative
dx pg(1)
dex is different
from zero (in order to have a denominator different from zero). 
Thus, it remains to show that such an x does indeed exist:
LEMMA 9 A natural number x meeting the condition given in Lemma 8 exists and is equal to g.
Proof
The rst derivative of pg(1) is
d pg(1)
de
= gp(1)g 1 d p(1)
de
















+ p(1)g 1 d2 p(1)
de2
#






24Again, this is due to the fact that lime!0 p(1) = 0 (Lemma 3, part (a)).






. All terms additively contained in the third derivative approach
zero in the limit for e ! 0. The critical ingredient to the equation is indeed the fact that everysum-
mand contains a power of p(1) which makes the entire summand vanish in the limit for vanishing
e.






which is additively connected to all the other terms. In this case (and only in this case), the critical
term p(1) disappears, because it is raised to the power of zero. Consequently, as the limit of




















= g!(nP(E1 = 1))g
6= 0
Thus, a number x is found, which makes the limit of a higher derivative of pg(1) unequal to
zero. This x is x = g. 
PROPOSITION 7
In the minimum effort coordination game with g competing groups, the equilibrium charac-





According to Lemmata 5 and 7, lime!0 a1 must be computed via L'Hôpital's rule. Lemma 8
in connectionwith Lemma 9 states that the limit does exist and is equal to one. This shows that the
longrun frequency of play of the lowest effort level approaches unity if the individual mutation




0   p(v)  1 8v (47)
Proof





p(k)+  p(v)  1 8v 2 E (48)
Proof
The expressionin (48) reaches its maximumpossible value at v=m. In this case, å
v 1
k=1 p(k)+
 p(v) gives the sum of all elements of the last row of transition matrix (8). Transition matrices are
stochastic matrices, i.e. their rows sum up to one. Consequently, Lemma 11 holds. 
LEMMA 12 å
v 1






























































= PnP(En = v)
 0

LEMMA 13 In the onegroup case, low equilibria are weakly stickier than high ones,
Dv  p(v) =  p(v)   p(v 1) 0: (50)
PROOF




































Pµ [1 P(Eµ = v)]










As P(En = v)  P(En = v 1) holds by assumption (6), it can be concluded that Dv  p(v)  0
which proves Lemma 13. 
PROPOSITION 8 For low numbers of competing groups, lowlevel equilibria (small v) are
stickier than highlevel equilibria (large v). For sufciently high numbers of competing groups,
this relation turns to the opposite.
Dv  pg(v)

< 0 for small g
> 0 for sufciently high g (23)
PROOF
Note that Dv  pg(v) can be written as






























Substituting a := å
v 1
k=1 p(k), b :=  p(v), c := å
v 2
k=1 p(k), and d :=  p(v 1), (51) can be written
as
Dv  pg(v) = [(a+b)g ag] [(c+d)g cg]
Lemma 10 shows that b  0, d  0. From Lemma 11, it is known that a+b  1, c+d  1.
a>c holds by simple observation. Lemma 12 shows that a+bc+d. Finally, due to Lemma 13,
d  b.
Lemma 13 shows that in the onegroup case, i.e. for g = 1, lower equilibria are stickier than
higherones. Generally,dependingonthe valueof g, higherorlowerequilibriamaybe stickier. The
followingsketches (Fig. 1) make clear that for low numbersof competinggroups,[(c+d)g cg]>
[(a+b)g ag], i.e. that lower equilibria are stickier than higher ones (Figure 1(a)). Sketch 1(b)
shows, that for sufciently high g (i.e. a sufciently convex curvature of the function xg), the
opposite will be the case.

D.2 Number of Groups



















(a) Low g : Dv  pg(v) < 0
 1














(b) High g : Dv  pg(v) > 0
Figure 1: Stickiness and Level of Equilibrium
PROOF
Compute the rst derivative of D(x) = xg 1 xg and set it equal to zero:
dD(x)
dx
= (g 1)xg 2 gxg 1 ! = 0
which results in x =
g 1










which shows that the optimum is indeed a maximum. 
PROPOSITION 9
The stickiness of low equilibria (small v) decreases in the number of competing groups. The
stickiness of high equilibria (large v) increases in the number of competing groups.
Dg  pg(v)

< 0 for low v
> 0 for high v (25)
PROOF
Rewrite the expression in (25):

































28Substitute a := å
v 1
k=1 p(k), b :=  p(v), such that (52) becomes
Dg  pg(v) = (a+b)g ag (a+b)g 1+ag 1
If it holds that (a+b)g 1 (a+b)g >ag 1 ag, thenDg  pg(v)<0. Makinguse of Lemmata 10





g gives the location of the maximum distance between xg 1 and
xg for 0  x  1 (see Lemma 14). (This is of course a sufcient, but not a necessary condition.)
According to Lemma 12, a+b will be small for low equilibria (small v). Consequently, the case
of Dg  pg(v) < 0, i.e. stickiness of equilibria falling with an increase in the number of competing
groups, is the relevant case for low equilibria and high g.
 1











(a) Low v: Dg  pg(v) < 0
 1











(b) High v: Dg  pg(v) > 0
Figure 2: Stickiness and Number of Groups
Ontheotherhand,if(a+b)g 1 (a+b)g <ag 1 ag,itturnsoutthatDg  pg(v)>0. Figure2(b)
shows that this is generally the case for a >
g 1
g (sufcient, but not necessary condition!). a is
higher, the higher v is. This nally means that for high equilibria, the stickiness increases with an
increase in the number of competing groups. 
D.3 Number of Group Members
LEMMA 15




























































and, because of n!





There is an important special case to Lemma 15:
COROLLARY 1
DnPn = Pn;n (54)
PROOF:











DnPµP(Eµ = v) (55)
PROOF














DnPµP(Eµ = v)+Pn;nP(En = v)










> 0 for small n (and/or small e)
< 0 for high n (and/or high e) (56)
PROOF
Note that every summand of the righthand side of (55) reads DnPµ P(Eµ = v), which,
accordingtoLemma15, is equaltoPµ;n
µ ne
n(1 e) P(Eµ =v). Asit is knownthatPµ;n 0, n(1 e)0,
and P(Eµ)  0, the sign of each summand is the sign of the expression µ ne. The sign of
this expression depends on the number of mutants on the one hand, and the number of group
members and the individual mutation probability on the other. There is one special case, which
is well determined: If all group members mutate, i.e. if µ = n, and if e < 1 (which should be
straightforward), the sign is positive. (This can be shown by using Corollary 1.)
DnPnP(En = v) = Pn;n
n ne
n(1 e)
P(En = v) > 0 if e < 1:
It is easy to conclude that for the general case, there are the more positive summands, the lower n
(and/or e) is. Consequently, for small group sizes n, Dnp(v) is likely to be positive, while for large
n (and high individual mutation probability e), Dnp(v) is likely to be of negative sign. 
LEMMA 18
Dn  p(v) =  p(v;n)   p(v;n 1)
can be of either sign. It is negative for high n and nottoo-small e, and it is positive for low n and
small e.
PROOF
From Proposition 7, it is known that




Pµ [1 P(Eµ  v)] :
Consequently, the difference is given by









DnP0 is negative. Dnp(v) and å
n 2
µ=1DnPµ [1 P(Eµ  v)] will both be negative for high n,




will almost always be positive.
Altogether, it can be concluded, that Dn  p(v) is negative for sufciently high n and nottoo-small
e, whereas for low n and/or small e, it is positive. 
31PROPOSITION 10 The stickiness of low equilibria (small v) increases in n. The stickiness of
high equilibria (high v) decreases in n.
Dn  pg(v)

> 0 for low v
< 0 for high v (27)
PROOF
Rewrite Dn  pg(v):






























In order to nd the sign of Dn  pg(v), the notationis simplied by substituting a= å
v 1
k=1 p(k;n),
b =  p(v;n), c = å
v 1
k=1 p(k;n 1), and d =  p(v;n 1), such that (57) reads
Dn  pg(v) = (a+b)g ag (c+d)g+cg
For the case of low n and nottoo-large e, it is known from Lemma 17 that a > c and from
Lemma18thatb>d, whichincombinationyields a+b>c+d. Figure 3(a)showsthat this results
in (a+b)g+ag >(c+d)g cg andthus that Dn  pg(v)>0. On the otherhand,for sufcientlylargen












a+b c+d a c












a+b c+d a c
(b) High n (and e): Dn  pg(v) < 0
Figure 3: Stickiness and Number of Group Members
It can be seen that Dn  pg(v) < 0, if d =  p(v;n 1) is relatively large, which according to
Lemma 13, is the case if v is relatively small. 
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